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THE HELMS AMENDMENT: A CONGRESSIONAL
ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT MANDATORY BUSING
IN DESEGREGATION CASES
I. Introduction
Congress, on a yearly basis, appropriates money to the ju-
dicial and executive branches of government for use in per-
forming their functions. The 1982 appropriations bill for the
Judiciary and the Departments of Justice, State, and Com-
merce contains an anti-busing amendment (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Helms Amendment).1 The controversial en-
actment reads:
No part of any sum authorized to be appropriated by this
Act shall be used by the Department of Justice to bring
any sort of action to require directly or indirectly the
transportation of any student to a school other than to
the school which is nearest the student's home, except for
a student requiring special education as a result of being
mentally or physically handicapped.'
As indicated by an ardent supporter of the Amendment, "this
language is clear and precise .... It means that the Justice
Department is not to press a court to order mandatory school
busing to achieve racial balance."8
Mandatory busing is a highly controversial issue. There is
distinct disagreement within American society as to the utility
© 1981 by Thomas D. Lawless
1. Amendment 96 to S. 951, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S6602 (daily
ed. June 19, 1981). Debate on this Amendment, also known as the Johnston Amend-
ment, was closed on September 16, 1981. 127 CONG. REC. S9727 (daily ed. Sept. 16,
1981). Representative Collins of Texas has introduced an identical amendment in the
House. H.R. 3462 § 13, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H2796 (daily ed. June 9,
1981).
Neither S. 951 nor H.R. 3462 have been voted on as of publication, however,
similar legislation was passed by the 96th Congress but was subsequently vetoed by
President Carter. H.R. 7584, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S14306 (daily ed.
Nov. 12, 1980). Given the current political atmosphere, this legislation can be ex-
pected to be passed and signed into law in 1982.
2. S. 951, as amended, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 56602, (daily ed.
June 19, 1982).
3. 126 CONG. REC. S14306 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1980) (remarks of Senator S.
Thurmond).
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of busing as a desegregation remedy. In addition to arousing
emotional differences of opinion among the people with re-
spect to the busing issue, the Helms Amendment raises cer-
tain constitutional questions. As enacted, this legislation may
offend the traditional separation of powers doctrine. Specifi-
cally, the Helms Amendment may be an unconstitutional in-
fringement by Congress on the Executive and Judicial
branches of the federal government. Furthermore, the Helms
Amendment may violate certain equal protection guarantees
contained in the Constitution. If found to dilute these equal
protection rights, this enactment would be an improper use of
Congressional authority.
This comment will explore the constitutional questions
posed by the Helms Amendment and focus upon the power of
Congress to prohibit the Executive branch of government
from seeking an available remedy in desegregation cases. The
analysis will not attempt to resolve the debate regarding the
use of mandatory busing. Rather, it will emphasize Congres-
sional use of the appropriations function to restrict the reme-
dial powers of the other branches of government. In order to
examine these issues it is necessary to begin with a brief dis-
cussion of the desegregation decisions from which the busing
remedy evolved.
II. THE BROWN DECISION AND ITS PROGENY
The adverse impact of racial segregation on the education
of minority school children was first recognized in Brown v.
Board of Education.4 In this landmark decision, the Court
held the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson'
unconstitutional. The Court found that segregation deprived
the Black children of equal educational opportunities, regard-
less of the equality of the physical facilities. In speaking for
the majority, Chief Justice Warren stated:
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy involved the separation of races, not in education,
but in transportation. The case, however, became the cornerstone for the adoption of
the "separate-but-equal" doctrine in the field of public education. See McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950);
Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337 (1938); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211
U.S. 45 (1908); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
6. 347 U.S. at 493.
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To separate [the minority children] from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race gener-
ates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect their hearp and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.7
In light of this finding, the Court concluded that the separate-
but-equal doctrine had to be abolished in the area of public
education. "Separate educational facilities were inherently
unequal."
The following year, the Supreme Court ruled that the pri-
mary responsibility for desegregation of the dual school sys-
tems lies in the hands of the local school boards." The major-
ity in Brown v. Board of Education (11)10 reasoned that "[flull
implementation of these constitutional principles [would] re-
quire solution of varied local school problems."" Therefore,
the local boards would be responsible for desegregating the
schools, with the local district courts overseeing the imple-
mentation process. The Court directed the school boards to
''make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance"
with the earlier Brown decision. 2 Desegregation was to occur
"with all deliberate speed."'3
The aftermath of the Brown decision brought with it
massive resistance in the South. The Court remained silent
about the implementation process for several years." "En-
forcement of the desegregation requirment was left largely to
the lower court litigation - and to the political arena"." Dur-
ing this time period, the desegregation efforts being made by
many local school boards were less than significant. Impatient
with this inactivity, the Supreme Court took charge of the sit-
uation in 1964.1a
The time for mere"deliberate speed" has run out, and
that phrase can no longer justify denying ... school chil-
7. Id. at 494.
8. Id. at 495.
9. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 299.
12. Id. at 300.
13. Id. at 301.
14. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 766 (10th ed.
1980).
15. Id.
16. Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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dren their constitutional rights to an education equal to
that afforded by the public schools in the other parts of
Virginia.1
7
The duty of the school boards to eliminate segregation
became immediate. Various schemes were devised by the
boards in an attempt to comply with the desegregation man-
date, but many of these programs were struck down by the
Court. Among these unacceptable plans were state preference
laws,'3 neighborhood school plans, 19 "freedom of choice"
plans2", and "free transfer plans."21
While the aforementioned desegregation plans were being
rejected as constitutionally unacceptable, one particular plan
withstood strong opposition. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Board of Education,22 the Supreme Court supported the
use of student transportation, stating that mandatory busing
was an acceptable tool in the desegregation process.23 Since
Swann, courts have uniformly upheld the constitutional valid-
ity of mandatory busing. Therefore, not only is bus transpor-
tation an integral part of the public education system, 4 it is a
critical factor in disestablishing the traditional dual school
17. Id. at 234.
18. See Kelly v. Board of Educ. of City of Nashville, 159 F. Supp. 272, 277-78
(D. Tenn. 1958). The court struck down a plan which authorized local school boards
to provide separate schools for white and black children whose parents voluntarily
elected that their children attend schools with members of their own race.
19. Neighborhood school plans called for assignment of students to the school
nearest their place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level and type
of education. They were deemed unconstitutional if an alternative plan would result
in a far greater degree of desegregation. Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 434 F.2d
144 (5th Cir. 1970). Furthermore, a school board may not use a neighborhood school
policy as a mask to perpetuate racial discrimination. See Spangler v. Pasadena City
Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 522 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
20. Under the freedom of choice plan, each pupil could annually choose be-
tween the areas' predominately black or predominately white schools. Those pupils
who did not make a choice were assigned to the school they previously attended.
Freedom of choice plans were declared constitutionally unacceptable where alterna-
tive desegregation methods were available. See Green v. County Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 430, 441 (1968). See generally Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968);
United States v. School Dist. No. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968).
21. Like freedom of choice plans, free transfer plans permitted children to
freely transfer from their assigned school to another school. These plans were deemed
constitutionally impermissible where more effective means to achieve desegregation
were possible. United States v. School Dist. No. 151, 404 F.2d 1125, 1135 (7th Cir.
1968).
22. 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 29.
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system.2 5
Numerous years have passed since the Brown Court man-
dated the desegregation of the public school system. As the
Supreme Court has recently noted, however, the effects of
state imposed segregation are still present.2 6 Until all rem-
nants of prior de jure segregation17 have been eliminated, local
school boards are under a constitutional obligation to dises-
tablish the dual school system.28
III. THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES' ROLE IN
DESEGREGATION CASES
The Executive and Judicial branches of the federal gov-
ernment have both encouraged and enforced the implementa-
tion of appropriate transportation schemes to alleviate segre-
gation. The Helms Amendment, however, appears to hinder
such action by restricting the funds necessary for enforcement
of busing policies. Since such restrictions will trigger a consti-
tutional challenge to the Helms Amendment arising out of
Congress' encroachment on the remedial powers of the Execu-
tive and Judicial branches, it is important to analyze the ef-
fect of the amendment on these governmental departments.
Before exploring this impact, however, this comment will
briefly examine the role of the Judiciary and Justice Depart-
ment in the desegregation effort.
A. The Role of the Judiciary in Desegregation
Since the Brown decision, the federal courts have taken
charge of overseeing the desegregation process. Local school
boards became answerable to the district courts regarding
their integration plans. Any violations of the Brown mandate,
as well as any procrastination on the part of local school offi-
cials, were settled in the courtroom. As a result, the federal
courts have been the instrumental force in fashioning reme-
dies for non-compliance with the desegregation order. In fash-
25. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 473 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
26. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Pennick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
27. De jure segregation is racial separation of people as a direct result of state-
imposed segregation, rather than a result of economic and geographical factors or
"racially neutral official acts." Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Pennick, 443 U.S. 449, 456
(1979).
28. Id. at 458.
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ioning judicial remedies, the courts have recognized the im-
portance of student transportation. As the court noted in
Swann, the remedial technique of requiring busing of public
school students for purposes of racial desegregation is within a
court's power to provide equitable relief.2
Since Brown II, there have been attempts by Congress to
limit the ability of the Judiciary to mandate busing as a rem-
edy. 0 At times, the impetus to outlaw forced busing came
from the Executive branch.31 Both proposed and enacted leg-
islation demonstrate attempts by the Executive and Legisla-
tive branches of government to restrict the court's power in
the desegregation area. To date, this legislation has not suc-
ceeded in limiting the court's ability to order busing in school
desegregation cases. The Helms Amendment represents one
more attack, albeit an indirect attack, on the court's remedial
powers. Before this congressional enactment can be labeled
successful in this regard, it must withstand strong constitu-
tional challenges.
B. The Role of the Justice Department in Desegregation
The present role of the Justice Department in school de-
segregation is: (1) to monitor and enforce existing Court or-
ders requiring student desegregation in cases in which the
United States is a party; (2) to defend legal challenges to the
power and authority of the HEW 2 to promote non-discrimi-
nation in federally funded programs; 3 (3) to enforce statutory
prohibitions against discrimination in employment by public
29. 402 U.S. at 30.
30. See, e.g., Amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, 517 (1974).
31. See H.R. 13916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §3(a) (1972); H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972). These bills were sent to Congress by President Nixon. One bill called for
a moratorium on additional student transportation, with all existing court-ordered
busing stayed. The other bill provided that no court implement a desegregation plan
that would increase the average number of students transported over the preceding
year's average.
32. HEW has been split into the Department of Health and Human Services
and the Department of Education. However, the Reagan administration has cast
doubt on this scheme and because the relevant cases refer to HEW, this comment will
use HEW.
33. The court's decision in Brown v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1978),
afl'd, 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980), has subsequently limited HEW's enforcement
powers in desegregation cases. For a more detailed discussion, see text accompanying
notes 43-58 infra.
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and private educational institutions; (4) to pursue additional
cases involving de jure segregation of students; (5) to enforce
the rights of non-English speaking students to participate in
the benefits of public education; (6) to enforce equal opportu-
nity in housing (often a most necessary precursor of school
desegregation); and (7) to investigate and prosecute instances
of violent interference with school desegregation. 4
The priority of the Education Section of the Justice De-
partment is to monitor desegregation orders in an effort to in-
sure compliance by the school boards. Often, this duty in-
cludes the monitoring of court-ordered transportation plans,
with the Justice Department having the option of using the
judicial process to force compliance with the order.3 5 As stated
in Brown v. Califano,3 6 "[t]his option is especially meaningful,
given the Departments' historic role in civil rights enforce-
ment ... .
The Helms Amendment directly abolishes this particular
enforcement option. Its effect is to remove the Executive De-
partment from the area of mandatory busing. Rather than at-
tack the courts' power to order busing, Congress is attempting
to eliminate student transportation by restricting the primary
enforcement agency's ability to seek busing. This indirect at-
tack on forced busing through the appropriations function is
constitutionally valid only if Congress would have the power
to directly abolish the busing remedy. 3
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HELMS AMENDMENT
A. An Infringement On The Notion of Separation Of
Powers.
The Helms Amendment does not make mandatory busing
illegal, nor does it directly limit the court's ability to order
student transportation. This legislation merely prohibits the
Justice Department from seeking the busing remedy in school
34. Ross, The Role of the Justice Department in School Desegregation, 19
How.L.J. 64 (1975).
35. Id. at 64.
36. 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
37. Id. at 1232.
38. 126 CONG. REC. 14309 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1980) (Senator Weicker quoting a
letter from Daniel Pollitt, a professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill). See, e.g., Pollitt, Congressional Control of Judicial Remedies: President
Nixon's Proposed Moratorium on Busing Orders, 50 N.C. L. REv. 809 (1972).
1981] 1099
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
desegregation cases. Thus, the major issue is whether Con-
gress can use the "power of the purse" to restrict the Justice
Department from seeking and enforcing the busing remedy in
federal courts.
The Helms Amendment seems to represent a dangerous
encroachment on the Executive and Judicial branches of the
federal government. The Amendment restricts the ability of
the courts to review constitutional violations and fashion ap-
propriate remedies.39 In addition, this enactment restricts thb
prosecution of discrimination cases by the appropriate arm of
the Executive Branch; namely the Justice Department."'
1. Infringement Upon The Judiciary
The Helms Amendment does not expressly affect the Ju-
dicial Branch of government. It does, however, significantly
reduce the power of the courts to implement desegregation by
removing an important remedy from judicial cognizance. If
Congress cannot directly limit the court's ability to proscribe
the busing remedy, any indirect encroachment upon this re-
medial power is similarly improper. "1
Since the Supreme Court decision of Marbury v.
Madison,"2 this country has accepted the notion that the Ju-
diciary is the interpreter of the Constitution. It was in the
performance of this function that the courts fashioned the
busing remedy. Congress, by this enactment, may be unconsti-
tutionally encroaching on the interpretive powers traditionally
reserved to the courts.
Congressional ability to limit busing depends in large part
upon the powers conferred to the Legislature under Section 5
of the fourteenth amendment. Section 5 grants Congress the
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, fourteenth
amendment guarantees. The courts have found that the avail-
ability of a desegregated school system is guaranteed under
the fourteenth amendment, and that busing is the only ade-
quate means of assuring such guarantees. In light of this find-
ing it would appear that enactment of the Helms Amendment
not only falls outside Congress' Section 5 powers, but also in-
fringes upon the Judiciary's remedial function. Limits upon
39. 126 CONG. REC. 14309 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1980)(remarks by Senator
Weicker).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
1100 [Vol. 21
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Congressional action under Section 5 will be discussed later in
this comment.
2. Infringement Upon The Executive Branch
a. The Esch and Eagleton-Bidden Amendments. Two
recent Congressional enactments attempt to limit the enforce-
ment powers of an executive agency-in the desegregation area.
The statutes are directed at the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare (HEW), the agency primarily charged
with enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act4 in the field of
education. These statutory enactments, commonly known as
the Esch 4 and Eagleton-Biden" Amendments, prevent HEW
from relying on Title VI to order the implementation of de-
segregation plans that require the busing of students to
schools other than those closest to their homes."
The constitutionality of these amendments was at issue
43. 42 U.S.C. §2000(d) (1976). Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, or national origin under any program receiving federal financial
assistance.
44. The Esch Amendment was enacted as §215(a) of the Equal Educational Op-
portunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 517, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1721
(Supp. V 1975). It provides:
No court, department, or agency of the United States shall . . . order
the implementation of a plan that would require the transportation of
any student to a school other than the school closest or next closest to
his place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level and
type of education for such student.
20 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (Supp. V 1975). The amendment's broad language was narrowed,
however, by another provision of the 1974 Act which reads:
[T]he provisions of this chapter are not intended to modify or diminish
the authority of the courts of the United States to enforce fully the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
20 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (Supp. V 1975).
45. The Eagleton-Biden Amendment was enacted as part of Pub. L. No. 95-205,
91 Stat. 1460 (1977). It provides:
None of the funds contained in this Act [HEW's appropriation] shall be
used to require, directly or indirectly the transportation of any student
to a school other than the school which is nearest the student's home,
except for a student requiring special education, in order to comply with
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For the purposes of this section
an indirect requirement of transportation of students includes the trans-
portation of students to carry out a plan involving the reorganization of
the grade structure of schools, the pairing of schools, or the clustering of
schools, or any combination of grade restructuring, pairing, or cluster-
ing. The prohibition described in this section does not include the estab-
lishment of magnet schools.
Id.
46. Brown v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 837, 838 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 627 F.2d 1221
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
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before a United States District Court in Brown v. Califano.47
There the plaintiffs asserted that the statutes violated their
equal protection guarantees. The court found that HEW had
two enforcement options in cases where publicly-funded
school systems were not integrated.4 8 The first option involved
a decision by the HEW to terminate public-funding of any
school system which failed to comply with busing orders.4 9 Al-
though this funding decision was reviewable by the courts, it
was the result of an Executive Department initiative. This
provision gave HEW the power to implement busing orders
independently of the Legislative and Judicial branches of the
government.
The second enforcement option available to HEW was to
refer desegregation cases to the Department of Justice.5 0
Upon referral, the Justice Department could initiate a suit for
relief designed to insure compliance with the desegregation
mandate."
In Califano, the plaintiffs contended that HEW's
unimparied ability to insure equality in education through the
fund termination process was a constitutional necessity and,
therefore, the Esch and Eagleton-Biden amendments were un-
constitutional.2 The court, however, found that neither the
Esch nor the Eagleton-Biden amendments prevented HEW
from pursuing the referral alternative where, in the agency's
judgment, transportation is warranted. 5 This finding was crit-
ical to the court's holding. The majority opinion clearly em-
phasizes that the constitutional challenge to these statutes
falls short because of the referral alternative. Specifically, the
court stated:
[T]he fact remains that the Esch and Eagleton-Biden
Amendments leave untouched the litigation enforcement
option that permits the Civil Rights Division of the De-
partment of Justice, upon referral of a case from HEW, to
pursue legal action and obtain the full measure of appro-
priate relief, including student transportation if war-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 839.
49. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.8.10 (1977).
50. 45 C.F.R. § 80.8(a) (1977).
51. 28 C.F.R. § 50.3 (1977).
52. 455 F. Supp. at 840.
53. Id.
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ranted, against the offending recipients. In short, contrary
to the situation presented in Swann, the statutes involved
in the case at bar, do not qualify as "flat" or "absolute
prohibitions" against the use of needed transportation
remedies. While they remove one setting out of which
busing orders may originate, they quite clearly preserve
student transportation as an available method of insuring
equality in education."
The court noted that these amendments worked a signif-
icant adjustment in the ways in which the Executive branch
may go about insuring equal opportunities in education.
However, since neither amendment operated by its express
terms to foreclose the availability of remedies necessary to
guarantee constitutional rights, the challenged statutes were
upheld by the court."
The importance that the court placed upon the ability of
the Department of Justice to litigate in these matters cannot
be overemphasized. In upholding the constitutionality of the
amendments, Judge Sirica warned that:
Should further proceedings in the case reveal that the liti-
gation option left undisturbed by these provisions cannot,
or will not, be made into a workable instrument for effect-
ing equal... educational opportunities, the Court will en-
tertain a renewed challenge ... on an as applied basis. '7
On appeal, the circuit court reaffirmed Judge Sirica's
well-reasoned opinion.58 The appellate court noted that the
lower court's finding of an alternative federal avenue to effect
transportation remedies saved the amendments from constitu-
tional challenge on their face.5 9
b. Applying Brown v. Califano to the Helms Amend-
ment. Under the Califano rationale, the Helms Amendment
appears to be an ill-fated attempt by Congress to eliminate
the last available avenue open to the executive branch with
respect to the busing remedy. By enacting this amendment,
54. Id. at 841 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 843.
56. Id. It is important to note that the constitutional attack on these provisions,
as well as the court's holding in the case, related only to the facial constitutionality of
the amendments. The court did not reach the issue of whether the amendments were
unconstitutional in effect.
57. Id. (emphasis omitted).
58. 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
59. Id. at 1234.
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Congress has completed a two-step process that results in the
eradication of all federally initiated busing orders. It is inter-
esting to note that the Legislature has accomplished this se-
quential elimination without addressing the real issue of
whether busing should continue to be an acceptable remedy
for school desegregation.
The two-step process used by Congress involved three
amendments, all enacted as floor amendments to appropria-
tions bills. The first step was the enactment of the Esch and
Eagleton-Biden Amendments, discussed above; the second,
and final, step was the enactment of the Helms Amendment.
The Esch and Eagleton-Biden Amendments prohibited
the HEW from seeking the busing remedy through the fund-
termination process, a previously effective method of insuring
compliance with Brown I and II. While prohibiting this action
on the part of HEW, these amendments left untouched the
power of HEW to refer desegregation cases to the Department
of Justice for enforcement through the litigation process2 °
Due to this available alternative, the amendments withstood
constitutional attack.6 1
With the enactment of the Helms Amendment, Congress
will complete the second step of the anti-busing scheme. By
prohibiting the Justice Department from seeking the busing
remedy, the executive branch of government becomes power-
less to protect the rights of those deprived of equal protection
in certain school desegregation cases.
The enactment of these anti-busing amendments creates
an interesting phenomenon. With respect to busing, the only
remedy of the executive branch left untouched is the ability of
HEW to transfer desegregation cases to the Department of
Justice for litigation. However, this is an empty alternative,
for once the case is transferred, the Justice Department is
foreclosed from participating in any suit which seeks the bus-
ing remedy. Therefore, through a well-timed, indirect, two-
step process, Congress has accomplished what it may not have
had the power to do directly; that is, forbid the Executive
Branch of the federal government from seeking the busing
remedy in school desegregation cases.
Should the Helms Amendment be allowed to stand, the
60. 455 F. Supp. 837.
61. Id.
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fears of Judge Sirica will be realized; namely, this enactment
will have "the practical effect of taking the core out of the
government's overall Title VI enforcement program ....
Furthermore, not only is the Justice Department restricted
under the Helms Amendment, but the Judiciary's remedial
power in desegregation cases is also severely diminished. 3
Therefore, under the Court's reasoning in Califano64, this leg-
islation appears to be an unconstitutional violation of the
traditional separation of powers doctrine.
B. Violation of Equal Protection under the Laws.
Freedom from segregated school systems is a constitu-
tional right.0 5 As noted by Justice Powell in his concurring
opinion in Keyes v. School District No. 1:"
Although nowhere expressly articulated in these terms, I
would now define it as a right, derived from the Equal
Protection Clause, to expect that once a State has as-
sumed responsibility for education, local school boards
will operate integrated school systems within their respec-
tive districts. This means that school authorities must
make and implement their customary decisions with a
view toward enhancing integrated school opportunities.
67
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, s the Court stated that Con-
gress could not use its spending power in a manner that vio-
62. Id. at 843.
63. The court's power is restricted in that it will be denied judicial scrutiny of
those cases in which the Justice Department would ordinarily seek the busing rem-
edy. Senator Weicker states:
Let me ask, who is it who is going to enforce the Constitution of the
United States? Who is it that is going to bring to the recognition of the
judiciary the inequities of life which are violations of the Constitution
and of law? Who is charged with that responsibility if indeed it is not
the Justice Department of the United States?
126 CONG. REC. S14308 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1980) (remarks of Senator Weicker).
64. 455 F. Supp. at 837.
65. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
66. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
67. Id. at 225-26 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (empha-
sis omitted).
68. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). This case involved a constitutional challenge to a re-
quirement in a congressional spending program. The program provided that 10% of
federal funds granted for local public works projects must be used by the states to
procure services and supplies from minority businesses.
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lates equal protection. 9 Therefore, to be sustained as a proper
exercise of Congressional authority, the Helms Amendment
must withstand an equal protection argument. Upon such a
challenge, Congress will base the legitimacy of this legislation
upon Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. The Helms
Amendment must fall within the powers granted to Congress
under that section.
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment "is a postive
grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. ' 70 "By including Section 5, the draftsmen [of the Con-
stitution] sought to grant to Congress, [with respect to the
fourteenth amendment,] the same broad powers contained in
the Necessary and Proper Clause."'1 Thus, the purpose of the
legislation must be to promote a particular, legitimate and
constitutional end.
[L]et the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not pro-
hibited, but consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutionals.7
To be constitutional under Section 5, the Helms Amend-
ment must be found to enforce the guarantees of the Equal
Protection Clause. It appears that this legislation cannot be
construed to accomplish this end. Rather than operating to
secure the guarantee of equal protection under the laws, the
Helms Amendment serves to restrict a constitutional right,
i.e., the right to be free from the effects of a dual school sys-
tem.73 In restricting the use of a particular remedy in desegre-
gation cases, Congress is diluting the rights of minority school
children to equal protection of the laws. In some cases, the
effect is not only to dilute those rights, but to actually remove
from judicial review what may prove a necessary remedy to
eliminate illegal discrimination.74
69. The Court based its decision on the equal protection component of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 480-92.
70. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
71. Id. at 650.
72. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
73. See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text.
74. 126 CONG. REC. S14309 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1980) remarks by Senator
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In writing for the majority in Katzenbach v. Morgan,"5
Justice Brennan articulated the limits upon Congress when
enacting legislation under Section 5:
... [Section] 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise
discretion . . . and to enact "statutes so as in effect to
dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this
Court." We emphasize that Congress' power under Sec-
tion 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guar-
antees of that Amendment; Section 5 grants Congress no
power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.7 6
Congress' attempt to limit the federal court's power to ex-
tend to racial minorites constitutionally protected rights
places special burdens on those minorities seeking to imple-
ment constitutional guarantees and, thus, dilutes their equal
protection rights." Since racial classifications are a suspect
classification 7 8 a court must strictly scrutinize such Congres-
sional action and uphold it only if supported by a compelling
state interest.
79
In light of the limitations of Congress' power to dilute
equal protection rights, the Helms Amendment may be un-
constitutional upon strict scrutiny. Given the frequency with
which school boards have felt the need to adopt transporta-
tion plans to eliminate segregation, it can hardly be said that
this amendment does not hinder desegregation. This enact-
ment completely restricts the principal enforcement agency in
this area from seeking a major, if not sole, remedy for a con-
stitutional violation. It is difficult to imagine a more profound
dilution of equal protection rights.
Racially separate educational facilities are inherently un-
equal. 0 To the extent that segregation exists, the fourteenth
Weicker.
75. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Morgan involved a constitutional challenge to § 4(e) of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This section provided that no person who has success-
fully completed the sixth primary grade in Puerto Rico could be denied the right to
vote because of an inability to read or write English. Plaintiffs contended that this
federal statute prohibited the enforcement of New York election laws, which required
an ability to read and write English in order to meet voting eligibility requirements.
76. Id. at 651-52, n.10 (1966).
77. J. Nowak, HORNBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 695 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Nowak].
78. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
79. Nowak, supra note 77, at 695.
80. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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amendment allows and requires appropriate remedies, includ-
ing transportation."' The Helms Amendment effectively ter-
minates the busing remedy. Although the legislation does not
restrict the courts from ordering busing, the practical effect of
preventing the Justice Department from enforcing busing
plans is to abolish the remedy. Therefore, what remains is a
right without a remedy. The deprivation of a constitutionally-
based remedy is the same as a deprivation of a constitutional
right.8
V. CONCLUSION
Since the Brown decision in 1954, the courts have at-
tempted to insure that minority students are guaranteed the
right to equal protection of the laws in the area of public edu-
cation. In so doing, they have confronted long-standing pat-
terns of discrimination among the racial elements of American
society. Nonetheless, the Judiciary, along with Congress and
the Executive Branch have attempted to insure equal educa-
tional rights for all citizens.
The Helms Amendment represents an encroachment
upon the executive and judicial branches of government. Spe-
cifically, it removes the executive branch from any litigation
that involves student transportation and thus removes the
busing issue from judicial review.
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment grants Congress
the power to enact legislation that enhances equal protection
guarantees. The Helms Amendment, however, does not ap-
pear to fall within the remedial powers conferred upon Con-
gress by this section. Rather than enhancing equal protection
rights, this amendment dilutes the rights of minority students
to attend integrated schools. If the courts make such a find-
ing, the Helms Amendment will probably be held
unconstitutional.
Today, almost three decades since the Brown decision,
the words of Chief Justice Warren still ring true:
Today.... education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments. Compulsory school
81. See United States v. Watson Chapel School Dist., 446 F.2d 933, 937 (1971).
82. 126 CONG. REC. S14310 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1980) (remarks by Senator Ken-
nedy). The Senator referred to mandatory busing as a "constitutional-based" remedy
because it is "an effective and appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation."
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attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society .... In these days
• . . it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available on equal terms.83
Mandatory busing may not be the solution to discrimina-
tion in education. Elimination of a remedy that offers even
the slightest positive contricution, however, without offering a
more productive alternative, is a step backward in the struggle
for equal educational opportunity.
Thomas D. Lawless
83. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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